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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate a vertically di¤erentiated market
served either by a multiproduct monopolist or by duopolists, in which a
public authority aiming at increasing the welfare level can choose among two
instruments, namely, quality taxation/subsidization, and minimum quality
standard. In the monopoly case they are equivalent as to the social welfare
level, in that both allow the regulator to achieve the second best level of social
welfare he would attain if he were to set qualities under the monopoly pricing
rule, while they are not equivalent in terms of the distribution of surplus.
In the duopoly regime, we show that there exists a taxation/subsidization
scheme inducing …rms to produce the socially optimal qualites.
JEL classi…cation: H21, L12, L13
Keywords: vertical product di¤erentiation, taxation/subsidization, min-
imum quality standard
1 Introduction
The welfare analysis of taxation or subsidization in imperfectly competitive
markets stems from the convergence of two originally di¤erent streams. The
…rst deals with the de…nition of social welfare. The second derives from the
notion of market failure and the consequent envisaging of a public interven-
tion to correct it. The earliest analytical treatment of these issues dates
back to Dupuit (1844, 1849), who claims that a monopolist, independently
of her property structure, should price-discriminate among consumers (see
also Ekelund, 1970), although the private entrepreneur would entirely extract
consumer surplus, while the social planner would price proportionally to in-
dividual reservation prices, so as to break even (Dupuit, 1854). The issue of
optimal pricing appears in the English literature with Ramsey (1927) who
analyses a tari¤ schedule minimizing the distortion a¤ecting demand, under
the constraint that …rms’ pro…ts be non-negative.1 In Hotelling’s (1938) view,
a public …rm should price at marginal cost and …nance any loss through tax-
ation. Questioning the applicability of marginal cost pricing, Allais (1947, p.
220) proposes the adoption of tari¤s departing proportionally from marginal
costs. Then, Boiteaux (1956) adopts an approach to optimal pricing that
completely dispenses with the concept of consumer surplus.
The literature in this …eld has largely disregarded the interaction between
…rms’ pricing behaviour and their ability to di¤erentiate products, although
Dupuit (1849) stresses that a monopolist supplying several varieties of the
same good or service may o¤er suboptimal qualities to low-income consumers
in order to force richer ones to pay higher prices for superior qualities. This
issue has received a …rst characterization by Spence (1975), who highlights
that a pro…t-maximizing monopolist will distort the output for a given quality
level, and vice versa. In the same vein, Mussa and Rosen (1978) show that,
under full market coverage, the extent to which a multiproduct monopolist
undersupplies qualities increases as the income of consumers who purchase
such qualities decreases, so that, as the number of varieties tends to in…nity,
only top-income consumers are being provided with the same quality as under
social planning. An inductive proof of this is in Lambertini (1997a), where
it is also shown that the quality distortion vanishes under partial market
coverage. Several measures have been envisaged to regulate the behaviour
1For a recent exposition of this topic, see Baumol and Bradford (1970). Later develop-
ments are discussed by Yang and Stitt (1995), inter alia.
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of a vertically di¤erentiated multiproduct monopolist. Spence (1975) shows
that rate of return regulation (RORR) can be attractive if quality is capital-
intensive. Besanko et al. (1987, 1988) compare such a policy with minimum
quality standard (MQS) and maximum price regulation (MPR). They …nd
that, under price ceiling, the monopolist increases the distortion at the high
end of the market, and conversely at the low end, and welfare increases if
price regulation is slight enough. As to the MQS policy, they claim that
its welfare e¤ects are ambiguous because it might exclude some consumers
from the market; moreover, those consumers for whom the standard is not
binding receive the same quality they would purchase in the absence of MQS.
A growing amount of e¤ort is being devoted to investigating the design of
MQSs (Ronnen, 1991; Motta and Thisse, 1993; Crampes and Hollander,
1995; Ecchia and Lambertini, 1997; Scarpa, 1998). Some general results are
that (i) all qualities increase as a reaction to the MQS; (ii) the MQS may
increase the pro…t of the low-quality …rm; (iii) welfare is higher after the
introduction of the MQS, provided the latter does not induce any …rm to
exit. MQS’s main shortcoming is the asymmetry introduced in the quality
stage, so that the resulting misallocation of demand prevents the regulator
from attaining the …rst best. To the best of our knowledge, the only existing
study of taxation in a vertically di¤erentiated duopoly is due to Cremer and
Thisse (1994), who consider the impact of an ad valorem tax, showing that a
uniform ad valorem tax, with the same rate applying to both products, lowers
both equilibrium qualities and distorts the allocation of consumers between
…rms. If the tax rate is su¢ciently low and its proceeds are redistributed as
a lump-sum transfer, it turns out to be always welfare-improving, although
unable to attain the …rst best. The adoption of a non-uniform tax scheme
may or may not appear socially desirable.
In the real world, a regulator may …nd it pro…table to use a mix of several
instruments, but our aim is to investigate the impact of regulative measures
directly a¤ecting quality levels in a multiproduct monopoly, in isolation from
any other policy instruments, such as RORR, MPR or ad valorem and excise
taxation. The policy we consider are related to the hedonic characteris-
tics of the goods under consideration, and can take the form of either a
taxation/subsidization scheme, or an MQS. Examples of both policies can
be found in the automobile industry, with (i) tax schedules related to …scal
horsepower rather than the actual engine horsepower; and (ii) the widespread
compulsory adoption of airbags and safety belts, while examples of the for-
mer are penalties introduced to limit the production of polluting components
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in the chemical industry, where quality standards have also been adopted in
order to preserve the environment. We show that the e¤ectiveness of these
instruments drastically depends upon market structure. In a duopoly regime
with single-product …rms, quality taxation/subsidization achieve the social
optimum, while an MQS policy is unable to do so, due to its inherent asym-
metry in a¤ecting product qualities. In a multiproduct monopoly regime, we
prove that, when the quality range is discrete while consumer distribution is
continuous, the adoption of an MQS a¤ects the entire range. This contrasts
with previous contributions in this …eld (Besanko et al., 1987, 1988). More-
over, we show that, unlike what happens in oligopolistic settings, the two
policies are equivalent in a monopolistic market, being both able to achieve
the second best level of social welfare that a public authority would attain
by choosing qualities under the monopoly pricing rule, the social optimum
remaining out of reach.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The basic model
is described in section 2. Section 3 deals with social planning and the un-
regulated monopoly and duopoly regimes. The optimal design of regulation
policies is investigated in section 4, and …nally section 5 provides some con-
cluding comments.
2 The Setting
We adopt the model of vertical di¤erentiation due to Cremer and Thisse
(1994), which is a two-product speci…cation of Mussa and Rosen’s (1978).
The model is worked out under the hypothesis of complete information. In
particular, we assume that quality levels are common knowledge, i.e., they are
immediately observable by the regulator.2 Two vertically di¤erentiated goods
are supplied, whose respective quality levels are denoted by qH > qL > 0:
Both varieties are being produced through the same technology, represented
by the following cost function:
Ci = tq
2
i xi; t > 0; i = H;L; (1)
2This amounts to assuming that technology is common knowledge. A wide literature
deals with the case where there exists an information asymmetry between producers and
the public authority concerning the cost structure (and thus product quality). See La¤ont
and Tirole (1989a,b; 1993).
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where xi denotes …rm i ’s output level. Consumers are uniformly distributed
over the interval [µ; µ]; with µ = µ¡ 1: Their total density can be normalised
to one without loss of generality. Parameter µ represents each consumer’s
marginal willingness to pay for quality. The market is fully covered, and
each consumer buys one unit of the variety i which maximizes the following
indirect utility function:
U = µqi ¡ pi ¸ 0: (2)
Given production costs (1), the maximization of consumer surplus (2) would
imply that the quality preferred by a generic consumer indexed by a marginal
willingness to pay µ would be µ=(2t), so that the range of preferred qualities
is de…ned by [(µ ¡ 1)=(2t); µ=(2t)] (see Cremer and Thisse, 1994, p. 617).
Consumers can be divided into two groups: those buying the high-quality
good, and those buying the low-quality good, the indi¤erent consumer being
at eµ = (pH ¡pL)=(qH ¡qL): Hence the demands for the two commodities are,
respectively:
xH = µ ¡ eµ = µ ¡ (pH ¡ pL)
qH ¡ qL iff 0 < µ ¡
eµ < 1; (3)
xH = 1 iff µ ¡ eµ ¸ 1; xH = 0 iff µ ¡ eµ · 0;
xL = eµ ¡ (µ ¡ 1) iff 0 < eµ ¡ (µ ¡ 1) < 1; (4)
xL = 1 iff eµ ¡ (µ ¡ 1) ¸ 1; xL = 0 iff eµ ¡ (µ ¡ 1) · 0:
3 Social optimum and the unregulated equi-
libria
Under full market coverage, pricing above marginal cost only activates a
mechanism to redistribute surplus from consumers to producers, without af-
fecting the overall level of welfare. Hence, provided that producers are among
consumers, a social framer can neglect any redistribution issue. Then, the
problem of welfare maximization consists in …nding the quality pair that max-
imizes the following social welfare function, de…ned as the sum of consumer
and producer surplus:
SW =
Z eµ
µ
(µqL ¡ tq2L)dµ +
Z µ
eµ (µqH ¡ tq
2
H)dµ: (5)
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By solving the system of …rst derivatives of (5) w.r.t. qH and qL, it can
be veri…ed that the social planner ”locates” qualities in the …rst and third
quartiles of the interval of consumers’ preferred varieties, setting qspH = (4µ¡
1)=(8t) and qspL = (4µ¡ 3)=(8t): The level of welfare at the social optimum is
SW sp = (16µ
2 ¡ 16µ + 5)=(64t): Equilibrium demands are xspH = xspL = 1=2:
For future reference, we brie‡y illustrate the unregulated duopoly and
monopoly equilibria. We borrow the former from Cremer and Thisse (1994)
and Lambertini (1996). Firms’ objective functions are ¼H = (pH ¡ tq2H)xH
and ¼L = (pL ¡ tq2L)xL, respectively. They play a non-cooperative two-
stage game in qualities and prices, whose solution yields qdH = (4µ + 1)=(8t);
qdL = (4µ ¡ 5)=(8t); and pdH = 49=(64t); pdL = 25=(64t): Notice that equilib-
rium qualities are positioned well outside the socially preferred interval, i.e.,
duopoly is characterized by excess di¤erentiation at equilibrium. Demand
is equally split at equilibrium, with xH = xL = 1=2: Social welfare under
duopoly is SW d = (16µ
2 ¡ 16µ + 1)=(64t): The welfare loss, as compared
to the social optimum, is due to the strategic e¤ect leading …rms to seek
reciprocal di¤erentiation in order to soften price competition (Shaked and
Sutton, 1982; 1983).3 The constraint µ > 9=4 must be satis…ed in order for
the poorest consumer located at µ to be able to buy in equilibrium.
Consider now an unregulated pro…t-seeking monopolist o¤ering both va-
rieties (see Lambertini, 1997a). She maximizes ¼m = (pH ¡ tq2H)xH + (pL ¡
tq2L)xL w.r.t. prices and qualities. Provided that the poorest consumer must
be able to buy the low-quality good, the optimal monopoly price for that
variety is pmL = (µ¡ 1)qL, at which the consumer whose marginal willingness
to pay is µ = µ ¡ 1 is exactly indi¤erent between purchasing the low-quality
good and not purchasing at all. The optimal price for the high-quality good
obtains from the …rst order condition (FOC):
@¼m
@pH
=
µqH + µqL ¡ 2pH ¡ 2qL + tq2H ¡ tq2L
qH ¡ qL = 0; (6)
yielding pmH = (µqH+µqL¡2qL+ tq2H ¡tq2L)=2: Then, di¤erentiating ¼m w.r.t.
3This is analogous to a well known result characterizing the Hotelling duopoly model
with quadratic transportation costs. Cremer and Thisse (1991, p. 386) establish its formal
equivalence to the vertically di¤erentiated duopoly with quadratic variable costs of quality
improvements employed here.
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qualities, we obtain the following FOCs:
@¼m
@qH
=
(µ ¡ tqH ¡ tqL)(µ ¡ 3tqH + tqL)
4
= 0; (7)
@¼m
@qL
=
(2¡ µ ¡ tqH + 3tqL)(µ ¡ 2¡ tqH ¡ tqL)
4
= 0; (8)
whose solution yields the monopolist’s optimal qualities, i.e., qmH = (2µ ¡
1)=(4t) and qmL = (2µ¡3)=(4t): Equilibrium prices are pmH = (2µ
2¡3µ+2)=(4t)
and pmL = (µ ¡ 1)(2µ ¡ 3)=(4t); equilibrium demands are xmH = xmL = 1=2;
pro…ts amount to ¼m = (4µ
2 ¡ 8µ + 5)=(16t): The corresponding welfare is
SWm = µ(µ¡1)=(4t): The constraint ensuring the positivity of all equilibrium
magnitudes is µ > 3=2:
The pro…t-maximizing monopolist undersupplies both qualities as com-
pared to social planning, the distortion being larger in the low-quality seg-
ment of the market. Furthermore, the degree of di¤erentiation chosen by the
monopolist is twice as wide as under social planning, due to the monopolist’s
attempt at extracting as much consumer surplus as possible by enhancing
di¤erentiation beyond the socially preferable level. As a consequence, the
monopolist’s price-and-quality scheme determines di¤erent demands as well
as di¤erent pro…ts for the two varieties at equilibrium. This will have relevant
bearings on the choice of the optimal policy by the regulator.
4 Alternative regulation policies
The policy menu we analyse includes two kinds of intervention that share
the features of being aimed at a¤ecting product choice, i.e., quality taxa-
tion/subsidization and minimum quality standard. In the previous section,
we have calculated the level of social welfare in the …rst best con…guration. It
will become clear in the remainder of this section that a second best analysis
is unnecessary in the case of duopoly, in that we will show that there exists a
policy measure capable to attain the social optimum. On the contrary, as a
benchmark for the regulation of a two-product monopolist, we need to work
out the maximum level of social welfare attainable given the monopolist’s
pricing rule. Under the latter, maximizing social welfare as de…ned in (5)
yields
qsbH =
6µ ¡ 3 +p3
12t
; qsbL =
2µ ¡ 3 +p3
4t
; (9)
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where superscript sb stands for second best. The following inequalities hold:
qsbi > q
sp
i > q
m
i ; i = H;L; (10)
qmH ¡ qmL > qsbH ¡ qsbL > qspH ¡ qspL : (11)
The fact that each second best quality is higher than its counterpart under
social planning can be interpreted by observing that the socially optimal
qualities are de…ned in correspondence of marginal cost pricing. Given the
distortion in prices introduced by the pro…t-seeking monopolist, the compen-
sation operated on the quality side is such that both qualities end up being
higher than under social planning. It is also worth noting that the increase
in the quality level is decreasing as we step up along the quality range, i.e.,
qsbL ¡qspL > qsbH¡qspH : This mirrors the fact that, under monopoly, the distortion
increases in the opposite direction. As a result of the upgrading observed in
qualities, the equilibrium demand levels are xsbH = 0:2113 and x
sb
L = 0:7887:
The second best level of social welfare is SW sb = (6µ
2¡6µ+p3)=(24t), with
SW sp > SW sb > SWm: To attain SW sb, the regulator avails of two alterna-
tive instruments, namely, the adoption of a taxation/subsidization of possibly
both product qualities or the introduction of an MQS a¤ecting directly the
low quality and only indirectly the high quality. In the next subsection we
explore the monopoly setting.
4.1 Monopoly
4.1.1 Taxation/subsidization of product quality
Here we examine the e¤ects exerted on the monopolist’s quality choice by a
taxation/subsidization policy designed as follows:
Ti = ki(qi ¡ ji)2 + cki; ki 2 R; i = H;L; (12)
where ki is the unit tax/subsidy rate applied to variety i, ji is the starting
point appropriately selected by the regulator for the taxation/subsidization
schedule of variety i, and cki is a lump-sum transfer. The sign of c determines
whether Ti is a tax or a subsidy.
The goal of the social planner is to identify the pair (kmH ; k
m
L ) that forces
the monopolist to supply the second best quality levels (9). In case of tax-
ation, the proceeds are assumed to be redistributed among consumers. The
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quadratic term in Ti preserves both the manageability and the concavity of
the problem.4 We are going to show that the following holds:
Proposition 1 If jL · (6µ+15¡ 13
p
3)=(12t), there exists an optimal pair
of unit rates kH and kL such that the second best level of social welfare is
attained in a monopoly regime. If c is su¢ciently high, the monopolist is
being taxed, otherwise she is being subsidized.
Proof. The objective function of the monopolist looks now as follows:
¼m(T ) = (pH ¡ tq2h)xH + (pl¡ tq2L)xL ¡ TH ¡ TL: (13)
Assuming the monopolist has optimally set prices, we can con…ne our atten-
tion to quality choice. By di¤erentiating ¼m w.r.t. qH and qL and substituting
both with their respective second best levels (9), we can simplify the FOCs
as follows:
@¼m
@qH
=
kH(3¡
p
3¡ 6µ + 12tjH)
6t
= 0; (14)
@¼m
@qL
=
kL(3¡
p
3¡ 2µ + 4tjL)¡ t(1 +
p
3)
6t
= 0: (15)
From (14) it appears that kmH = 0: As a consequence, the high-quality product
is neither taxed nor subsidized. On the other hand, from (15) we obtain
kmL = t(1+
p
3)=[3(3¡p3¡2µ+4tjL)]; which represents the optimal rate for
the low-quality good, provided that the second order condition for concavity
is met. It can be shown that
@2¼m
@q2L
· 0 i¤ jL · (6µ + 15¡ 13
p
3)
12t
: (16)
Moreover, the critical threshold established for jL in (16) is lower than qsbL
for all admissible values of µ: Finally, we are now in a position to verify that
TL > 0 i¤ c >
(1 +
p
3)4tjL ¡ 8tj2L ¡ 2¡
p
3
8
; (17)
which implies that the low-quality good is being taxed if the lump-sum trans-
fer is su¢ciently high, otherwise it’s being subsidized. Equilibrium pro…ts
are ¼m(T ) = [6(3¡p3)µ2¡12(4¡p3)µ+19¡7p3]=[24(3¡p3)t]¡TL(kmL ):
4The concavity of the …rm’s maximum problem is guaranteed if the public authority
introduces either (i) a linear tax or subsidy function; or (ii) a convex tax function; or
(iii) a concave subsidy function, where the convexity, concavity or linearity is meant w.r.t.
quality. Analogous consideration holds in a duopoly setting. For a proof, see Lambertini
(1997b), where a Hotelling model with quadratic transportation cost is used.
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4.1.2 Minimum quality standard
Consider now the situation where regulation takes place through an MQS
aimed at increasing the average quality level by setting a lower bound to
the monopolist’s quality range. We assume that in setting the standard,
labelled as qmqsL , the regulator acts as if he were playing simultaneously a
noncooperative game with the monopolist. We prove the following
Proposition 2 As a result of the adoption of an MQS, the monopolist pro-
duces the second best qualities qsbH and q
sb
L :
Proof. The FOC for welfare maximization w.r.t. qL is
@SW
@qL
=
8µ ¡ 4¡ 3µ2 ¡ 16tqL + 12µtqL + 3t2q2H ¡ 6t2qHqL ¡ 9t2q2L
8
= 0:
(18)
As to the monopolist, the FOC for pro…t maximization w.r.t. qH is
@¼m
@qH
=
µ
2 ¡ 4µtqH + 3t2q2H + 2t2qHq2L ¡ t2q2L
4
= 0: (19)
The only root of the system (18-19) such that the concavity conditions are
satis…ed for both the monopolist and the regulator, and qH > qL > 0;
is given by
¡
qmqsH = (6µ ¡ 3 +
p
3)=(12t); qmqsL = (18µ ¡ 11:4115)=(36t)
¢
: It
can be immediately veri…ed that these qualities correspond to qsbH and q
sb
L ,
respectively. Equilibrium pro…ts are ¼m(MQS) = ¼m(T ) + TL(kmL ):
The same correspondence obviously holds as to welfare levels and the dis-
tribution of demand across products in the two settings. As a straightforward
consequence, we may establish the following
Corollary 1 As to the welfare level achieved, the regulator is indi¤erent
between adopting a quality taxation/subsidization scheme and introducing an
MQS.
This also proves that the regulator’s optimal behaviour consists indeed
in simulating a simultaneous and noncooperative game against the …rm. In
other terms, the public authority could not do any better by acting as a
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Stackelberg leader, i.e., by maximizing social welfare w.r.t. qL under the
constraint represented by the monopolist’s reaction function implicitly de-
…ned by (19).5 Another relevant corollary of Proposition 2 is
Corollary 2 As a result of the introduction of an MQS, quality increases
both in the low segment and in the high segment of the market.
This contrast with the …ndings of Besanko et al. (1987, 1988), who claim
that the quality increase is observed only in the low segment, where the MQS
is binding (see their Proposition 1, 1987, p. 750). This strictly depends
on the assumption that the quality range is continuous, eliminating thus
any adjustment triggered by regulation along the remainder of the surviving
product range. In a discrete setting, the immediate consequence of a standard
is to induce the monopolist to ”relocate” upwards all her quality spectrum,
since the unregulated level initially chosen for the high-quality product would
no longer be optimal in presence of the MQS. It is worth noting here that,
under the alternative assumption of partial market coverage, the monopolist
would exactly provide the socially optimal qualities, and the distortion would
solely a¤ect the output level, so that an MQS policy would be completely
ine¤ective (see Lambertini, 1997a).
4.2 Duopoly
4.2.1 Taxation/subsidization of product quality
As before, we consider a taxation scheme de…ned by (12). Given the sym-
metry of the model and the assumption of full market coverage, the scheme
we propose cannot a¤ect total output being supplied by duopolists, and
it is only meant to ensure an e¢cient distribution of …rms (or their prod-
ucts) along the quality range. Each …rm’s pro…t function is then ¼di =
(pi ¡ tq2i )xi ¡ ki(qi ¡ ji)2 ¡ cki; i = H;L: We prove the following:
5The same conclusion has been drawn by Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) in a duopoly
setting. The above proof could also be generalized to show that any lower bound imposed
on the monopolist’s strategy space would induce her to supply the same qualities the
public authority would produce, in that both agents have the same FOC w.r.t. qH . E.g.,
it could be easily shown that the regulator could compel the monopolist to produce qspH
and qspL by setting q
mqs
L = q
sp
L , but this obviously would not maximize welfare under the
monopolist’s pricing rule.
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Proposition 3 For all jH 2
£
(2µ ¡ 1)=(4t); (4µ ¡ 1)=(8t)¤ and for all jL 2£
(4µ ¡ 3)=(8t), (2µ ¡ 1)=(4t)¤ ; there exists an optimal rate k maximising so-
cial welfare. If parameter c is su¢ciently high, …rms are being taxed, other-
wise they are being subsidized.
Proof. Proceeding backwards, it is immediate to verify that equilibrium
prices, as a function of qualities, are the same as in the unregulated game,
since FOCs at the market stage are unmodi…ed. Moreover, by symmetry,
we can set kH = kL = kd: Equilibrium qualities can be found by solving the
FOCs at the …rst stage,
@¼dH
@qH
=
3t2q2H + 2t
2qHqL ¡ t2q2L ¡ 4µtqH ¡ 4tqH ¡ 18kd(qH ¡ jH) + µ(µ + 2) + 1
9
= 0;
(20)
@¼dL
@qL
=
t2q2H ¡ 2t2qHqL ¡ 3t2q2L + 4µtqL ¡ 8tqL ¡ 18kd(qL ¡ jL)¡ µ(µ ¡ 4)¡ 4
9
= 0;
(21)
using the additional information that jH and jL must obviously be symmetric
and respect the relationship:
jH + jL =
µ
2t
+
µ ¡ 1
2t
=
2µ ¡ 1
2t
: (22)
This can be exploited by plugging jL = (2µ¡1)=(2t)¡jH into the low-quality
…rm’s pro…t function. As a result, qualities are set at their socially optimal
levels, qdH = q
sp
H = (4µ ¡ 1)=(8t) and qdL = qspL = (4µ ¡ 3)=(8t); if
kH = kL = k
d =
2t
3(4µ ¡ 8tjH ¡ 1)
: (23)
It is easy to verify that (i) the denominator of the expression in (23) is positive
if the ”upper starting point” of the scheme, jH ; lies within the interval of
the socially preferred varieties; and (ii) the second order conditions for the
concavity of the pro…t functions are met if jH 2
£
(2µ ¡ 1)=(4t); (4µ ¡ 1)=(8t)¤
and jL 2
£
(4µ ¡ 3)=(8t); (2µ ¡ 1)=(4t)¤.
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Moreover, notice that the behaviour of the optimal rate k¤ is hyperbolic,
with
lim
jH!qspH¡
kd = 1; lim
jH! 2µ¡14t
kd =
2
3
t: (24)
This implies that, if the ”starting point” selected by the regulator is very
close to the socially preferred qualities, the rate kd needed to induce …rms to
supply precisely those qualities becomes in…nitely high.
Equilibrium pro…ts are ¼dH = ¼
d
L = 2ct=(3(8tjH ¡ 4µ + 1)) +(8tjH + 7¡
4µ)=(96t): Finally, it can be veri…ed that
Ti =
4µ ¡ 8tjH ¡ 1
96t
+
2ct
3(4µ ¡ 8tjH ¡ 1)
> 0 i¤ c > ec = ¡(4µ ¡ 8tjH ¡ 1)2
64t2
< 0:
(25)
This condition states that there exists a critical threshold ec above (below)
which …rms are being taxed (subsidized). E.g., when jH = jL = (2µ ¡
1)=((4t); i.e., jH and jL coincide with the midpoint of the interval of preferred
qualities, it is a straightforward exercise to show that Ti is positive for all
c > ec = ¡1=(64t2):
4.2.2 Minimum quality standard
Here, we brie‡y resume the analysis contained in Ecchia and Lambertini
(1997). The main result is stated in the following
Proposition 4 In a duopoly market, the MQS policy is unable to attain the
…st best qualities.
The derivation of the optimal MQS under a duopoly market regime yields
qdL(MQS) =
20¹µ ¡ 34 + 9p6
40
: (26)
Given qdL(MQS) and its equilibrium price, full market coverage is possible
if and only if ¹µ ¸ 2:23926: Observe that the introduction of the standard
slightly loosens such a constraint as compared to the unregulated setting.
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The new level of the high quality is the best reply of the high-quality …rm to
the MQS:
qdH(MQS) =
20¹µ + 2 + 3
p
6
40
: (27)
The new equilibrium pro…ts are ¼dL(MQS) = 0:22153 and ¼
d
H(MQS) =
0:06714: As a result of the adoption of the MQS, the degree of di¤erentiation
decreases, and the demand for the high quality decreases while the demand
for the low quality increases. Moreover, notice the drastic reduction in the
high-quality …rm’s pro…ts. Since the increase observed in the pro…t accruing
to the low-quality …rm is lower, total industry pro…ts decrease considerably
as compared to the unregulated equilibrium.
Social welfare amounts to SW d(MQS) = [200¹µ(¹µ¡ 1) + 18p6¡ 13]=800;
which is obviously higher than that observed in the unregulated setting, but
lower than SW sp. The increase in welfare is due to two e¤ects: (i) the
increase in both quality levels; (ii) the increase in price competition, due to a
reduced degree of product di¤erentiation. However, the e¤ect of the MQS on
consumer surplus is not identical across consumers. The MQS increases the
surplus of consumers purchasing the low quality for all acceptable values of ¹µ,
while it decreases the surplus of consumers patronizing the high quality if ¹µ is
su¢ciently high. Summing up, in this case it appears that the MQS policy,
provided it is designed to maximize welfare regardless of its redistributive
e¤ects, trades o¤ the losses su¤ered by the agents (…rm and consumers)
dealing with the high quality with the gains enjoyed by the other agents, but
remains far from the ideal target represented by …rst best.
4.3 Discussion
The ine¢ciency arising in markets where a …rm controls product quality
as well as price is associated with the di¤erence between the average and
the marginal consumer’s evaluation of quality, represented by parameter µ:
Spence (1976, pp. 426-7) shows that, when quality is a capital-intensive
rather than labour-intensive feature, rate-of-return regulation is an appeal-
ing measure. This is the case, e.g., when product quality is the result of
R&D e¤ort, so that the cost function exhibits no interaction between qual-
ity and quantity. (Ronnen, 1991; Motta and Thisse, 1993). In our model,
the cost function (1) might suggest that quality requires a combined use of
capital and labour in variable proportions. This prompts for the design of
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alternative interventions, as those depicted above. In the monopoly setting,
although both measures yield the same level of welfare, the adoption of a
taxation/subsidization scheme entails a surplus transfer from the monopolist
to consumers, which does not take place under the MQS regime. Since the
regulator is assumed not to be interested in surplus distribution and the MQS
policy is e¤ort-saving as compared to the design of a taxation/subsidization
policy, one might think that the former policy is more likely to be adopted.
The perspective changes considerably when the market is a duopoly with
single product …rms, in which case the two policies are not equivalent, with
the MQS being unable to yield the …rst best while taxation/subsidization
allows the regulator to attain such a goal.
A crucial question naturally springs to mind, that is, whether the intro-
duction of the MQS induces the monopolist to drop one of the two products,
and reoptimize with respect to a single variety. This would have undesirable
welfare consequences (for an example pertaining to oligopoly settings, see
Scarpa, 1998). To address this question, we can work out the single-product
pro…t the monopolist would gain by providing a quality corresponding to
the optimal MQS with a single good, qm = (2µ ¡ 1)=(4t), the price being
pm = (µ¡ 1)qm. Such a pro…t amounts to ¼m1 (MQS) = (4µ
2 ¡ 8µ+3)=(16t):
Hence, we have
¼m2 (MQS)¡ ¼m1 (MQS) =
11¡ 5p3
48(3¡ p3)t > 0; (28)
so that the adoption of an MQS does not induce the …rm to restrict the
product range.
An analogous question can be asked concerning the duopoly setting. In
the case where an MQS is adopted, we already know that pro…ts are strictly
positive. In the case of taxation/subsidization, …rms’ pro…ts are positive if
c < bc = ¡(4µ ¡ 1¡ 8tjH)(4µ ¡ 7¡ 8tjH)=(64t2); with bc ¡ ec > 0 everywhere
and bc > 0 for all jH 2 £(2µ ¡ 1)=(4t); (4µ ¡ 1)=(8t)¤ ; wherein second order
conditions are satis…ed. Hence, the adoption of such a policy does not drive
…rms out of business, as long as c is su¢ciently low.
5 Concluding remarks
We have investigated the issue of regulating either a multiproduct monopolist
or single-product duopolists operating under vertical di¤erentiation, through
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policies a¤ecting her quality choice. The relative e¤ectiveness of the policy
instruments included in the menu we have considered turns out to be very
sensitive to market structure. In the monopoly case, neither of the two al-
ternative policy measures is able to attain …rst best. We have shown that
there exists a second best quality range characterized by quality levels higher
than their counterparts under social planning, and we have described how
such second best con…guration can be attained through the alternative adop-
tion of either hedonic taxation/subsidization or a minimum quality standard
(MQS). As to their …nal results, these measures are completely equivalent,
while they are not in terms of the distribution of surplus. We have also
shown that the introduction of a standard does not lead to a reduction in
the number of available varieties. In the duopoly case these two instruments
o¤er a very di¤erent performance. The asymmetric e¤ects exerted by the
MQS on the two products prevents the public authority to induce …rms to
supply the …rst best quality levels, which on the contrary can be obtained
under the taxation/subsidization policy we have envisaged. This leads to
prefer the latter intervention to the former.
The issue of designing the socially preferable intervention as a combina-
tion of the several policy instruments that can be envisaged to regulate a
market for endogenously di¤erentiated products is left open for future re-
search.
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